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Open market share repurchase programs and corporate governance: 
company performance 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those 
based on cash dividends.  We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly-governed 
companies outperform weakly-governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. 
Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-
announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust 
to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control 
variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes 
in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are 
consistent with strongly-governed companies using the financial flexibility derived from 
choosing share repurchases over cash dividends to drive better performance.  Consistent with 
current literature on attenuation of former anomalies, the associations we find between 
governance and post-announcement performance tend to disappear in the latter half of our 
sample period.   
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1. Introduction 
We propose and test an agency-based hypothesis to explain the relation between 
company corporate governance and changes in company valuation and operating performance 
after open market share repurchase program announcements (henceforth share repurchase 
programs). For companies who possess it, free cash flow presents a potential agency conflict 
(Jensen, 1986). Companies can mitigate this conflict between managers and shareholders by 
simply paying out excess cash to shareholders through cash dividends or share repurchases 
(Easterbrook, 1984), and Jensen, 1986). Cash dividends represent a costly, credible agency cost-
reducing pre-commitment to pay out cash to shareholders for the foreseeable future (John and 
Knyazeva, 2006 and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). These pre-commitment costs 
may include sub-optimal future investment policy, cash dividend taxation, and future external 
financing costs. Share repurchases do not face these costs, but do not provide the agency cost-
reducing pre-commitment to pay out future cash. Despite their lack of pre-commitment benefits, 
share repurchases by U.S. corporations represent a significant and increasing portion of total 
distributions.1   
Following John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015), we develop a model where corporate 
governance and cash payout policies are substitutes for one another in reducing agency conflicts. 
In the context of their particular governance environment, companies choose their payout policy. 
Firms with relatively weaker governance mitigate their inherently higher agency conflicts by 
                                                 
1Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012) report that although the greatest number of repurchase 
announcements occurred in 1998 and 1999, the combined total dollar amount was higher in 2006 and 2007. Wang 
and Bost (2014) report on www.bloomberg.com that the proportion of cash flow used for share repurchases has 
doubled in the last decade. 
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choosing to pre-commit themselves to future cash dividends, while strongly-governed 
companies, with inherently lower agency conflicts, choose to maintain financial flexibility by 
paying out excess cash through share repurchases. In choosing its payout policy, each firm 
makes a tradeoff between governance and payout type. John et al. (2015) report results consistent 
with this model, concluding that weakly-governed companies tend to use regular cash dividends, 
and strongly-governed companies tend to use nonbinding share repurchases (or special 
dividends) for payouts (see also Grullon and Michaely, 2014). Using a 21-year sample of 
repurchasing companies, we examine whether adherence or lack of adherence with these 
tendencies is reflected in differential long-term post-announcement stock and operating 
performance. 
We find that announcements of share repurchase plans by strongly-governed companies 
that adhere to the tendency reported by John et al. (2015) are associated with better long-term 
performance relative to weakly-governed companies, which do not adhere to the tendency. Our 
results hold after controlling for different measures of performance, multiple control variables, 
and the self-selection problem identified by Heckman (1979). Our results are new to the 
literature, and suggest the strength of a company’s corporate governance system plays an 
important role as an ex ante indicator of announcing companies’ future performance. However, 
this positive association between governance and performance only holds for the first half of our 
sample period. We find no statistically significant association between governance and 
performance in the period after the year 2000, which is consistent with the findings in the 
growing literature on the attenuation of former market-related anomalies (Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2014). We conclude that a firm’s corporate governance system is 
both an important factor in the payout choice decision, as was concluded by John et al. (2015), 
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and an ex ante indicator of future performance, but that its association with performance has 
recently diminished (Fu and Huang, 2015). 
In Section 2, we develop our agency-based hypotheses by reviewing the literature on 
share repurchase programs and corporate governance, and briefly preview our results. We 
explain our data and methodology in Section 3. We present and discuss our results in Section 4. 
Our summary and conclusions appear in Section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Substitution between payout policy and corporate governance 
Our goal is to analyze the role corporate governance plays in the post-announcement 
performance of share repurchasing companies. Managers of strongly-governed companies are 
relatively more closely monitored, which tends to mitigate agency conflicts at these firms.  
Weakly-governed companies, conversely, face higher levels of agency conflicts due to their 
lower levels of managerial monitoring. Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2011) show that individual 
corporate governance mechanisms may act as substitutes for one another. For instance, 
companies with powerful boards tend to also have a greater number of protective antitakeover 
charter provisions and vice versa, which is consistent with the existence of an optimal mix or 
adequate number of governance mechanisms, beyond which there may be diminishing returns to 
additional agency conflict-reducing mechanisms.   
Governance is not the only way to reduce agency conflicts. Easterbrook (1984) describes 
the agency cost-reducing role played by cash payouts to shareholders via cash dividends and 
share repurchases, arguing that formal managerial monitoring is costly. Regular cash dividends 
force managers to generate the cash to make the payout and to access outside capital markets 
more frequently, both of which tend to substitute for tighter formal monitoring of management.   
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John and Knyazeva (2006) and John et al. (2015) argue that since a company’s corporate 
governance system defines its level of formal managerial monitoring, governance measures can 
be used to test the substitution between formal monitoring and cash payouts. While not 
contractually required, as are interest payments on debt, regular quarterly cash dividends 
represent an implied pre-commitment to pay out cash to shareholders. Surveys of corporate 
executives indicate that managers are loath to reduce or omit a cash dividend payment (Lintner, 
1956; Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman, 1985; and Brav, et al., 2005). This reluctance is backed by 
empirical findings of significant negative returns to dividend cuts and omissions (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989 and Healy and Palepu, 1988). Consistent with the agency cost-reducing role 
of dividends proposed by Easterbrook (1984), John et al. (2015) report event study results 
showing that the market reacts more negatively when weakly- relative to strongly-governed 
companies announce a surprise dividend cut. This stronger adverse market reaction when cutting 
their dividends combined with their greater tendency to pay dividends supports John et al. 
(2015)’s hypothesis that weakly-governed companies supplement their formal monitoring 
systems by pre-committing to regular cash dividends. Conversely, the tendency for strongly-
governed companies to pay out cash through repurchasing shares, coupled with a relatively less 
negative market reaction to dividend cuts is consistent with these companies having sufficient 
levels of monitoring without the need to pre-commit to cash dividends. For these companies, 
which already benefit from low agency conflicts, such pre-commitments are not only 
unnecessary, they may decrease value as the costs of the pre-commitment outweigh marginal 
reductions in already low agency costs. Without the need to pre-commit to cash dividends, 
distributing excess cash via a flexible share repurchase policy allows strongly-governed 
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companies to take advantage of value-enhancing closer ties between earnings, payouts, and 
investment policies.    
2.2 Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that substitution between strong governance systems and pre-
commitment to pay cash dividends, both which reduce agency conflicts, implies a difference in 
repurchasing companies’ post-announcement performance.  Strongly-governed companies 
enhance value by not pre-committing to permanent increases in cash dividends, thus avoiding 
their associated pre-commitment costs and enhancing future financial flexibility.2 However, for 
weakly-governed companies, the decision to repurchase shares precludes value enhancement 
from pre-commitments to cash dividends, and is incongruent with the tendencies reported by 
John et al. (2015).3 When these weakly-governed firms choose to repurchase shares instead of 
paying cash dividends, any gains from financial flexibility are offset by the losses associated 
with greater agency costs. In general, share repurchase programs will tend to be relatively more 
value-increasing for strongly-governed companies, and this separation between strongly- and 
weakly-governed companies should be reflected in differences in the long-term post-
announcement operating performances and stock returns of the repurchasing companies.   
2.2.1. Post-announcement operating performance 
Prior post-announcement operating performance studies have reported mixed results. 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that share repurchase program announcements are not 
followed by improvements in annual operating performance for their sample period from 1980-
                                                 
2 Possible benefits of this financial flexibility include freeing up future free cash flow for profitable future 
investment opportunities, which we examine later. 
3 Both Zwiebel (1996) and Myers (2000) develop models in which self-interested managers choose to pay cash 
dividends in order to preempt future control challenges or position the firm for future outside financing 
opportunities, respectively. Following John et al. (2015), we assume that share repurchases also provide these 
benefits to poorly-governed firms, but without the agency conflict-reducing pre-commitment benefits of paying cash 
dividends. 
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1996. Lie (2005) refines the analysis by using quarterly data collected from 1981-2000. Lie 
reports that announcing companies improve post-announcement operating performance for up to 
eight quarters relative to benchmark companies selected by an algorithm based on past 
performance. However, this average improvement is limited primarily to companies who follow-
up their share repurchase announcements with actual share buybacks. Using a sample of 
companies announcing repurchase programs between 1984-2002, Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) 
find that the more heavily a firm uses accruals to manage pre-announcement earnings downward, 
the more positive the subsequent operating performance (see also Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and 
Wang, 2010).4 Chen and Wang (2012) report positive (negative) abnormal changes in operating 
performance for financially unconstrained (constrained) companies announcing 1990-2007. Due 
to the costs of pre-committing to cash dividends, the benefits of financial flexibility associated 
with share repurchases, and the payout tendencies reported by John et al. (2015), we posit the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1.  
 Strongly-governed companies have higher post-announcement long-term adjusted 
operating performance relative to weakly-governed companies. 
2.2.2. Post-announcement stock returns 
The literature is replete with studies examining the effects of share repurchase program 
announcements on long-term stock returns. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find 
average 4-year excess stock returns of 12.1% in their sample of repurchasing firms announcing 
1980-1990. Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) collect a sample of share repurchase 
announcements made from 1980-1996 and find 4-year post-announcement abnormal returns 
                                                 
4Chen and Huang (2013) report that such behavior has decreased markedly since passage of the Sarbannes-Oxley 
Act in 2002.   
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averaging 23.6%. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) report 4-year cumulative average abnormal 
returns of 24.2% in their sample of companies making share repurchase announcements from 
1991-2001. Finally, with a sample spanning 1984-2012, Fu and Huang (2015) report 3-year 
excess returns between 5%-10% for their full sample. With the costs and benefits of cash 
dividends and repurchases, respectively, and the payout tendencies reported in John et al. (2015), 
we posit the following hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 2. 
 Strongly-governed companies have higher post-announcement long-term abnormal stock 
returns relative to weakly-governed companies.   
2.2.3. Anomalies 
Recent work has shown that many of the equity market anomalies found in the earlier 
literature have diminished or disappeared completely (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 
2014), and attribute this attenuation to increased arbitrage activity. Fu and Huang (2015) find 
that post-announcement long-term performance increases following share repurchases and 
seasoned equity offerings have disappeared over the past decade, which they attribute to changes 
in the trading environment and enhanced regulations on corporate governance and information 
disclosure. In order to test whether this weakening of the association between governance and 
performance is present in our work, we split our sample into repurchase announcements made 
through the year 2000 and those made post-2000, and posit the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. 
 The relation between governance and post-announcement company performance has 
diminished since the end of year 2000.   
2.2.4. Factors affecting post-announcement performance 
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 If repurchasing shares provides relatively greater financial flexibility to strongly-
governed companies, it may be possible to identify ways in which this additional flexibility 
benefits these companies. We investigate two possibilities. First, CEO incentive compensation is 
intended to intensify managerial efforts to enhance firm value. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
measure the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in share prices and report the average 
CEO’s wealth increases by a statistically significant $3.25 for each $1,000 increase in firm value. 
Mehran (1995) finds that equity incentives lead to improved outcomes, reporting that firm 
performance is positively related to the CEO’s equity-based compensation percentage. Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) link corporate governance and CEO compensation to operating 
performance and stock returns. Separating out the equity component of compensation, our tests 
of Hypotheses 1 and 2 also find a positive relation between CEO equity compensation and post-
announcement operating and stock performance. Increased CEO incentive compensation after 
the repurchase announcement is one possible use of greater financial flexibility that may increase 
post-announcement company performance as stronger incentives lead to increased effort, which 
leads us to posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. 
 After announcing share repurchase programs, strongly-governed companies invest 
relatively more in their CEOs’ equity incentive compensation. 
 Another potential use (or misuse) of financial flexibility that could influence post-
announcement performance is acquisitions of other companies, which Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007) state is one of the largest forms of corporate investment. If an attractive takeover target 
presents itself, companies that have not previously committed to dividend payouts have 
relatively greater internal capital with which to finance the acquisition (John et al., 2015).  
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However, not all acquisitions benefit shareholders. As Jensen (1986) points out, managers have 
incentives, such as empire building, compensation plans focused on assets or sales size, and 
middle management promotion incentives, to grow firms under their control beyond optimal 
size. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) agree and report evidence that mergers can be good or bad for 
shareholders, and that acquirers in bad mergers that destroy shareholder value can set themselves 
up to become future takeover targets. A commonly used proxy for value-enhancing investment 
opportunities is Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the ratio of company market value to asset 
replacement value (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989 and Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 
2015). Acquisitions by firms with superior growth opportunities are more likely to provide 
synergistic benefits to shareholders than acquisitions by firms with inferior investment 
opportunities. Wang and Xie (2009) find evidence that when strongly-governed companies 
acquire weakly-governed ones, the merger creates more shareholder value. Masulis et al. (2007) 
present evidence that supports their hypothesis that poorly-governed companies are more likely 
to indulge in empire-building and value-destroying acquisitions. In order to examine this aspect 
of how financial flexibility affects post-announcement performance changes, we posit the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.  
 Strongly-governed companies with relatively superior investment opportunities increase 
post-announcement acquisitions of companies relative to other sample companies. 
2.3. Contribution 
To our knowledge, we are the first to focus on how corporate governance affects 
repurchasing firms’ adjusted long-term operating and abnormal stock performance. Following 
John et al. (2015), we measure corporate governance using the number of state antitakeover laws 
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in effect in the firm’s state of incorporation each year. This governance measure is exogenous to 
sample companies’ repurchase decisions (Karpoff and Wittry, 2015).5 Since the decision to 
repurchase is made in the shareholder payout policy context in general, we begin by studying 
tradeoff determinants between repurchases and dividends using probit regressions. Consistent 
with John and Knyazeva (2006) and John et al. (2015), we find that strong governance is 
positively associated with the repurchase decision, but negatively associated with regular cash 
dividends payments. In order to analyze the relation between long-term performance and 
corporate governance, we use the two-step Heckman (1979) methodology, which controls for 
sample selection bias. The dependent variables are the differences between pre- and post-
announcement operating performance adjusted for the performance of a benchmark company 
and the post-announcement abnormal stock returns. Our findings show a significant positive 
association between strong governance and post-announcement operating and stock 
performance. We also contribute to the literature on anomalies. Consistent with Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Wang (2013) and Fu and Huang (2015), we find in our sample that the association between 
governance and post-announcement performance disappears after the year 2000.  
Our results are robust to tests using subsamples of firms that (a) follow-up their 
repurchase announcements with actual repurchases, and (b) firms that make unexpected 
announcements. We find similar results after redefining our corporate governance measure as a 
transformed version of the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index and we 
include a measure of internal governance (John et al., 2015) showing that our results are robust 
to governance measurement. Finally, we investigate post-announcement changes in investments. 
                                                 
5 Karpoff and Wittry (2015) list companies that lobbied for enactment of their home state antitakeover laws, and 
argue that the resulting laws are endogenous for these specific companies. To eliminate this source of potential 
endogeneity, we remove these companies from our sample.  
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Consistent with a performance-enhancing use of financial flexibility, we find that strong 
governance tends to be associated with higher levels of investments in CEO incentive pay and 
acquisition activity.     
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Repurchase sample 
In order to analyze the share repurchase decision in the context of a firm’s overall payout 
policy, we collect a panel dataset comprised of all 53,523 companies listed on AMEX, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE with the quarterly Compustat, Exeucomp, Institutional Shareholder 
Services/RiskMetrics, and CRSP data to compute our variables. For the panel companies, we 
used SDC Platinum to identify share repurchase announcement dates made by U.S. companies 
January 1, 1991-December 31, 2011, excluding share repurchases made by non-U.S. companies, 
financial companies, firms that helped to motivate or actually lobbied for state antitakeover laws, 
firms for which we could not identify the state of incorporation, and all repurchase tender offers.6 
These data screens produce a total of 1,726 distinct quarterly share repurchase announcements 
over the sample period.7 All companies with available data during the sample period are included 
in our panel and first-stage Heckman regressions.  
3.2 Governance variables 
Following John et al. (2015), we measured the strength of a firm’s corporate governance 
using an index of the number of antitakeover laws enacted by the state in which the firm is 
incorporated. The smaller the index, which ranges from 0-5, the fewer antitakeover laws were 
enacted by a given firm’s home-state government, and the stronger the implied corporate 
governance. The state antitakeover laws include business combination, fair price, control share 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of share repurchase tender offers see Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981). 
7 We treat multiple repurchase announcements made by a company in a single quarter as one announcement. 
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acquisition, poison pill, and director’s duties laws (Karpoff and Wittry, 2015). In robustness 
tests, we also measure governance strength following John and Knyazeva (2006), who use an 
index (specified in section 4.5) comprised of three separate internal governance mechanisms to 
measure internal governance, and the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index as a measure of 
external governance.8 John and Knyazeva (2006) transform both indexes to range between 0-1 so 
that 1 indicates the strongest possible level of governance. Panel A of Table 1 presents various 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in our panel regressions, while their definitions appear 
below (and in Appendix B). Panel companies are subject to a mean (median) of 2.22 (1.00) state 
antitakeover laws, with a standard deviation of 1.64. The internal and external governance 
variables have means (medians) of 0.63 (0.67) and 0.58 (0.50), respectively. Panel B contains the 
Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables. While the correlation coefficients between 
the three governance measures are not large, they are statistically significant. The negative 
coefficients between the state law index and the internal (-0.052) and external governance (-
0.144) indexes indicates that strong state-level governance tends to be reinforced with strong 
firm-level governance. The negative coefficient between internal and external governance (-
0.115) is consistent with a substitution effect between strong internal and strong external 
governance. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.3.  Control variables 
Following John et al. (2015), we model the payout choice as a function of various 
company-specific control variables, and test the statistical significance of the addition of our 
                                                 
8 The internal governance index is based on relative rankings of higher institutional holdings (Cremers and Nair, 
2005), smaller boards of directors (Yermack, 1996), and higher proportions of independent directors (Weisbach, 
1988) each of which has been associated with stronger corporate governance (higher equity value). 
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governance measures. All control variables are lagged one quarter unless otherwise noted. Free 
cash flow is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization, interest expense and tax 
expense less capital expenditures to total assets, and controls for the excess cash flow hypothesis 
(Dittmar, 2000); Book-to-market is book- divided by market-value of equity, and controls for 
company growth opportunities (John and Knyazeva, 2006 and John et al., 2015); Log (total 
assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets and is included to control for small companies 
using repurchase announcements to signal performance (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990); 
Book leverage is total debt divided by total assets and controls for the use of share repurchases in 
capital structure policy (Chan, et al. 2004); CEO options equals the ratio of the aggregate S&P 
Black/Scholes value of CEO stock option grants during the year to company market value (Fenn 
and Liang (2001) and John et al., 2015); CEO ownership is the ratio of the number of shares, 
excluding option grants, owned by the CEO to the total number of shares outstanding (Fenn and 
Liang, 2001 and John et al., 2015); Payout/OCF is the ratio of the dollar amount of total cash 
payouts (repurchase and/or dividends) to operating cash flow and controls for the payout size 
(Dittmar, 2000); Takeover threat is the number of mergers and acquisitions within a Fama-
French 12 industry group and fiscal quarter, and is used to control for companies using the cash 
payout to deter a possible takeover attempt (Dittmar, 2000 and Billett and Xue, 2007); Tax is the 
ratio of tax expense to earnings before interest and taxes and controls for the influence of taxes 
on cash flow available for payouts (John and Knyazeva, 2006); Risk is defined as the standard 
deviation of a company’s excess returns and controls for the influence of market risk on a 
company’s willingness to payout cash to shareholders (John and Knyazeva, 2006); and Sales 
growth is the quarter-to-quarter change in sales and controls for higher opportunity costs of 
payouts for growing companies (John and Knyazeva, 2006). 
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3.4. Methodology 
We compute adjusted long-term operating performance using quarterly operating 
performance data obtained from Compustat following the Lie (2005) benchmark adjustment 
procedure controlling for industry, previous operating performance, and the market-to-book ratio. 
Our intent in using the Lie (2005) benchmarking procedure is to find the single industry competitor 
closest economically to each sample firm immediately prior to the repurchase announcement. We 
compute each repurchasing firm’s adjusted operating performance by taking the difference between 
the sample firm’s operating performance and that of the matched benchmark company as follows:  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑃𝑡,𝑠𝑖 = { ∑ (
𝑂𝑃𝑡,𝑠𝑖
𝑇
)𝑇𝑡=+1 −  𝑂𝑃𝑠𝑖  } − { ∑ (
𝑂𝑃𝑡,𝑏𝑖
𝑇
)𝑇𝑡=+1 −  𝑂𝑃𝑏𝑖 }          (1) 
where OP is the operating performance for sample company si or benchmark company bi, T 
equals 4, 8, or 12 quarters subsequent to the repurchase announcement, and  𝑂𝑃𝑖  is the average 
operating performance over quarters -3-0 for companies si and bi. See Lie (2005) for more 
information on selection of the benchmark company. 
 We compute abnormal post-repurchase long-term stock returns using monthly with-
dividend returns from CRSP following the standard Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1997) portfolio benchmark adjustment procedure controlling for company size (market 
capitalization), the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio, and the previous 12-month total stock 
return (henceforth referred to as DGTW). We implement the DGTW benchmarking procedure in 
July of each sample year by forming 125 benchmark portfolios. We compute the long-term 
cumulative abnormal return (LCAR) for 12, 24, and 36 months after a share repurchase 
announcement for each company announcing a share repurchase program. The LCAR for an 
individual security is the sum of the differences between a company’s monthly raw return and 
the monthly return for the respective benchmark portfolio to which it belongs and is given by: 
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𝐿𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑏  )𝑇𝑡=1                  (2) 
where T is the length of the accumulation period (12, 24, or 36 months), itR  is company i’s raw 
return in the tth calendar month following the share repurchase announcement, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑏  is the 
analogous return to the benchmark portfolio b. See Daniel et al. (1997) for more information on 
development of the benchmark portfolios. 
As we show in Table 2 below, a company’s payout policy is determined by various 
company and market characteristics. While our list of payout choice variables is extensive, there 
may be others, particularly nonpublic ones, which we have missed. These missing choice 
determinants, if not specifically modeled, may produce biased estimated coefficients.  Following 
Li and Prabhala (2005) we model our company performance analysis as a repurchase self-
selection problem.  The decision to announce a share repurchase is a discrete event; a company 
either makes the announcement or does not. We model this decision with a probit regression and 
the determining variables defined in Section 3.3: 
Choice to announce repurchase = R ≡ r* = Zi δ + μi > 0           (3) 
Choice to not announce repurchase = NR ≡  r* = Zi δ + μi ≤ 0          (4) 
Company performance after announcement = Yi = Xiβ + εi                (5) 
where Zi denotes the information expected to influence payout choice, δ is a vector of 
coefficients, and μi is an error term orthogonal to Zi. When r* > 0, the company makes the choice 
to repurchase and R = 1, and when r* < 0, it chooses not to repurchase and R = 0. However, we 
do not observe the value of r*, only the company choice, R or NR, when it decides to repurchase 
or not. If the company chooses R, then we calculate performance measures, Yi, for company i, in 
which case Xi denotes a set of variables we expect to be related to company performance, β is a 
vector of coefficients, and εi is an error term that is orthogonal to Xi. Since Yi depends on choice 
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R, εi in Equation 5 is a function of Equations 3 and 4.  Through substitution, Equation 5 can be 
rewritten as:  
Yi = Xiβ + ρμεσελC(Zi δ)                (6) 
where ρμε is the correlation between bivariate normal error terms μi and εi, σε is the standard 
deviation of εi, and λC is the inverse Mills ratio. We use the two-step Heckman estimation 
method to estimate Equation 6. Stage one is a payout choice probit regression (Equations 3 and 
4), the estimates of which are used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. Stage 
two is an ordinary least squares regression of Equation 6 including stage one’s estimated inverse 
Mills ratio ?̂? as a regressor. The estimated coefficient on ?̂? estimates ρ. Many of the control 
variables in Xi are also included in the set of choice variables, Zi, with important exclusions. 
These exclusions provide identification for our system of equations estimations, which otherwise 
could suffer from collinearity.9 While variables Payout/OCF, Takeover threat, Tax, Risk, and 
Sales growth are intuitive possible determinants of the choice to repurchase, it is less clear how 
they would affect post-announcement performance. Therefore, we exclude these five variables 
from our stage-2 outcome regressions. Finally, since Gong et al (2008) find that companies tend 
to manipulate earnings prior to announcing share repurchases, we include in Xi Abnormal 
accruals computed in the same manner as Gong et al.10 
If there is self-selection bias introduced into the estimation of β, it will manifest itself as 
significant correlation, ρ, between the error terms μi and εi. The Wald test of independent 
equations (ρ = 0) is a Chi-square test with one degree of freedom. The Wald test rejects the null 
hypothesis of independent equations in the majority of our performance regressions reported 
                                                 
9 See Li and Prabhala (2005) for a discussion of identification in self-selection models. 
10 Appendix A provides details on how abnormal accruals are calculated using Compustat data. 
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below, particularly the abnormal stock return regressions. Therefore, sample selection bias 
appears to be a significant problem in our sample of repurchasing companies.11  
4. Results 
4.1 Probit regressions of payout policy 
We begin by analyzing a company’s payout choice. When choosing a payout policy, 
companies can make indirect payouts to shareholders via share repurchases, direct cash dividend 
payments to shareholders, or both. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present probit regressions results 
in which the dependent variable equals 1 in quarters when a sample firm announces a share 
repurchase and equals 0 otherwise. The difference between these two columns is that standard 
errors are clustered at the state level in Column 2 (as are the standard errors in Columns 3-7) and 
are not clustered in Column 1.12  In Column 3 the dependent variable equals 1 in quarters in 
which sample companies announce a share repurchase, without a concurrent dividend 
announcement, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients on our corporate governance 
measure, the state antitakeover law index, are negative and statistically significant in all three 
columns, indicating that good governance is associated with the choice to repurchase shares (a 
higher index implies weaker governance). Most of the estimates on the control variables are 
statistically significant. The decision to repurchase is negatively related to the book-to-market 
ratio, leverage, and sales growth, and significantly positively related to free cash flow, company 
size, CEO stock option holdings, the repurchase yield, and the takeover threat.  
                                                 
11 As noted above, we could also model the sample selection bias as an omitted variable problem where the omitted 
information is the private information used to help make the repurchase choice. In this case, statistically significant ρ 
indicates that private information is important in making r*  > 0, and the decision to announce a repurchase. 
12  Coefficient estimates are identical in Columns 1 and 2, but the robust z-statistics are different. We present the 
Column 1 results as those representative of the coefficients in stage one of the Heckman two-step methodology. 
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Columns 4 and 5 present the results of estimating coefficients for the same set of 
independent variables, but the dependent variables are dummy variables equal to 1 when a 
company pays a dividend or increases the dividend that quarter, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
The primary results are those related to our governance measure, and are the opposite sign from 
those in the case of the decision to repurchase. The positive and significant estimates on the 
governance variable in both columns are in contrast with those related to the repurchase decision, 
the dividend decision tends to be made by companies with relatively poor governance. These 
contrasting results for the governance estimates between repurchases and dividends are 
consistent with those of John et al. (2015). As for the control variables, the decision to pay a cash 
dividend is significantly negatively related to the book-to-market ratio, leverage, the takeover 
threat, the value of CEO options, and the risk variable, and significantly positively related to free 
cash flow, company size, the repurchase yield, and the tax ratio. In addition to the contrasting 
results for our governance measures, we note three conflicting control variable coefficient 
estimates for the repurchase and dividend decisions. The results for CEO options were consistent 
with option-holding CEOs choosing to both repurchase shares and to not pay dividends. 
Repurchasing shares reduces shares outstanding, thus spreading company earnings across fewer 
shares, which tends to enhance stock and option values. Not paying dividends prevents the loss 
of value associated with cash payouts as stock options do not participate in dividend 
distributions. Similarly, the results for the takeover threat variable indicate that when companies 
are confronted with a takeover threat, they tend to repurchase shares and tend not to pay 
dividends. The contrast between the positive and significant estimate on the risk term in the 
repurchase regressions (Column 3) and the negative and significant estimates in the dividend 
regressions is consistent with the idea that as market risk increases, companies are more reluctant 
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to pre-commit to and/or increase dividends, but are more likely to distribute excess cash through 
share repurchases. Finally, the results presented in Column 5 indicate that the factors influencing 
the decision to initiate a dividend for the first time are similar to those influencing the general 
dividend payment decision. 
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 2 present the Tobit regressions results of repurchases and 
dividends dollar amounts relative to the company’s operating cash flow on the same independent 
variables. The results are consistent with those in Columns 2 through 5. Most importantly, the 
estimated coefficients on our corporate governance measure are significantly negative in the 
repurchase regression and significantly positive in the dividend regression. When accounting for 
payout size, rather than just a particular payout type, strong governance continues to be 
associated with repurchases, while weak governance continues to be associated with dividend 
payments. In addition, CEO option value and the firm’s takeover threat level are positively 
related to the size of the repurchase, but negatively related to the size of the dividend payment. 
Market risk is negatively associated with repurchase and dividend dollar size, but significantly so 
only for dividends.     
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Operating performance  
Table 3 presents the second-stage results of the two-step Heckman estimation procedure 
where the outcome or dependent variable is the 4-, 8-, and 12-quarter adjusted operating 
performance on independent variables, including the strength of corporate governance and 
control variables.13 Models 1, 2, and 3 contain the estimated coefficients over the full sample 
period. The estimated coefficients on corporate governance are all significantly negative, 
                                                 
13 In the regression models for the full sample in Tables 3-14, the probit estimates are essentially identical to those 
contained in Column 1 of Table 2, and are not reported. 
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indicating better adjusted operating performance for more strongly governed companies. This 
finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Among the independent variables, repurchasing 
companies providing higher levels of incentive compensation for top management tend to 
outperform those whose managers are less incentivized, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
The negative and significant estimates on book-to-market across the three performance periods 
are consistent with Hypothesis 5; companies with better investment opportunities tend to 
outperform those with fewer such opportunities. Finally, companies with more free cash flow 
and less book leverage also tend to outperform those with lower cash flow and higher leverage. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we split our sample into subsamples from 1991-2000 and 2001-
2011.14 Models 4-6 (7-9) present the estimated coefficients for the earlier (later) sub-period. 
During the pre-2001 period, the estimated coefficients on corporate governance are larger and 
their statistical significance is stronger than the respective estimates in Columns 1-3. In the post-
2000 period, none of the estimated coefficients is different from 0.  This diminishment in the 
relation between performance and governance is consistent with Hypothesis 3. It is also 
consistent with Fu and Huang (2015), who report a disappearance in post-repurchase returns.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Stock performance 
Table 4 contains the second-stage results of the two-step Heckman estimation procedure 
in which the outcome or dependent variable is the 12-, 24-, or 36-month abnormal long-term 
stock return on independent variables, including the strength of corporate governance and control 
variables. Models 1, 2, and 3 contain the full sample estimated coefficients. The estimates for our 
governance measure are larger in absolute value than those for operating performance, and are 
                                                 
14 Chordia et al. (2014) note that decimalization of stock prices occurred in January 2001, and following them, we 
form subsample periods using December 2000 as our breakpoint. 
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statistically significant. The negative estimates indicate that strong governance is associated with 
better abnormal stock returns one, two, and three years after the repurchase announcement, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and with John, et al. (2015). Only two control variables 
are consistently statistically significant. Similar to the results reported in Table 3, the relative 
value of CEO stock options tends to be positively associated with abnormal stock returns, which 
is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and indicates that incentives matter in generating better 
performance. Unlike the operating performance results, smaller sized companies tend to have 
higher abnormal stock returns than larger companies.  Finally, we find little support for 
Hypothesis 5 as growth opportunities are positively associated with stock returns only in Model 
1. 
Examining our pre-2001 subperiod results for corporate governance, reported in Models 
4-6, the estimated coefficients on governance double in absolute value from those for the full 
sample, and their negative value indicates that strong governance is associated with better 
performance. During the latter period, reported in Models 7-9, the estimated coefficients are not 
statistically different from 0. This difference in the governance coefficients between the two 
subperiods is again consistent with Hypothesis 3, corroborates our Hypothesis 1 findings, and is 
consistent with Fu and Huang (2015).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
4.4 Carry-through and fresh repurchases 
In this section we investigate the potential effects on the association between governance 
and post-announcement performance of two share repurchase characteristics. Companies 
announcing open market share repurchase programs are under no obligation to repurchase 
shares. Actual share buybacks depend on subsequent market conditions, and this characteristic 
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actually enhances the flexible nature of repurchases relative to the pre-commitment associated 
with cash dividends. That is, if market conditions change after the announcement making a share 
repurchase undesirable, the company can simply not repurchase stock.  Lie (2005) finds that 
about 24% of his sample of announcing companies do not repurchase any shares within the 
announcement quarter, but that 76% of repurchasing firms continue to repurchase for at least one 
quarter after the announcing quarter (see Figure 1 in Lie, 2005). Gong et al. (2008) report that 
about 84.7% of their sample of announcing firms carry through with actual share repurchases in 
the announcement and subsequent quarter, and only these firms manage their earnings leading up 
to their announcements and experience improvements in subsequent performance. About 87.6% 
of our sample firms report actual repurchases by the quarter following the repurchase program 
announcement.15 In Tables 5 and 6, we rerun our analysis on the subsample of firms that follow 
their announced repurchase plans with actual repurchases in quarters 0 and +1. Comparing Table 
5 estimates with Table 3 estimates shows little difference in the relation between adjusted 
operating performance and corporate governance or the control variables. For the full sample 
period (Models 1-3) and the pre-2001 sample period, estimated coefficients on the governance 
measure in Table 5 are significantly negative, indicating a significant association between strong 
governance and better post-announcement operating performance.  Also similar to Table 3, the 
relation between governance and performance disappears in the post-2000 period. Finally, 
comparing the subperiod sample sizes allows us to examine possible changes in repurchasing 
behavior. The pre-2001 sample size in Table 3 (Table 5) is 860 (723), while the respective post-
2000 sample sizes are 856 (781). Thus, about 84.1% of sample firms carry through with their 
announced repurchases in the pre-2001 subperiod, nearly identical to the ratio reported by Gong 
                                                 
15 Following Gong et al. (2008) we identify companies that actually repurchase shares using Compustat. 
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et al. (2008), while 91% carry through in the post-2000-subperiod. Anecdotally, more companies 
tend to carry through with their announced repurchase programs post-2000. Table 6 contains the 
estimated coefficients when the abnormal stock returns are the dependent variables, and while 
negative and similar in size, the governance estimates using the full sample period are not quite 
statistically significant using conventional significance levels. In the pre-2001 subperiod, the 
estimates are significantly negative, while in the post-2000 subperiod the estimates are 
insignificant. While the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is lower in Table 6, 
the general findings are consistent with and supportive of our conclusions from Table 4.  That is, 
strongly-governed companies tend to have higher abnormal stock returns after making share 
repurchase program announcements. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Many companies continually renew their repurchase programs so that repurchase 
announcements may eventually be expected by the market. Since they may provide a larger 
element of surprise, there may be a stronger market reaction to companies making share 
repurchase announcements for the first time, which Grullon and Michaely (2002) show 
empirically.16   In subsequent cumulative abnormal return regression analysis, they run a separate 
regression with a first-time announcers sample only and report similar results to the estimated 
coefficients using their full sample. Li and McNally (2007) examine a sample of Canadian 
companies and report a significant difference in announcement period abnormal returns between 
first-time (0.93%) and repeat (0.53%) announcements, which they define as a repurchase 
announcement within a year of a previous announcement. Following Grullon and Michaely 
                                                 
16  Although they do not separate out the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for non-first-time announcements, the 
mean CAR for first-time announcements (3.13%) is larger than that for their full sample (2.57%). 
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(2002), we ran a separate regression with our non-repeat announcers sample, which we define as 
a repurchase announcement that was not preceded by another announcement within the previous 
year, and which we term as “fresh” announcements. Table 7 contains the results, using our fresh 
repurchase announcement subsample, of regressing adjusted operating performance on corporate 
governance. The sample size drops from 1,716 to 1,089, a reduction of about 36.5%.  The 
estimate coefficients on our measure of corporate governance are very similar to those with the 
full sample in Table 3, and our conclusions remain unchanged. Strong governance is associated 
with better future adjusted operating performance in the full sample, but that association is 
limited to the pre-2001 subperiod only. The relation between governance and operating 
performance disappears after 2000. We present in Table 8 the regression results using abnormal 
stock returns as the dependent variable, and while the estimated coefficients are larger in 
absolute value, their statistical significance is somewhat weaker. Our conclusions, however, 
remain the same as in Table 4: strong governance is associated with better long-term stock 
returns for the full sample and the first subperiod, but not the second subperiod.   
Previous researchers have discovered that not all share repurchase announcements are 
followed by actual repurchases, and that surprise repurchase announcements are more 
informative to the market. After accounting for these two characteristics of share repurchases, we 
continue to find support for each of our hypotheses. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.5 Robustness to governance measurement 
In this section we test our findings’ robustness to the specific measure of corporate 
governance. Following John et al. (2015) we replace the state-level antitakeover law index with 
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two separate firm-level governance indexes. The first is a transformation of Bebchuk et al. 
(2009)’s E index computed as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  
6 − 𝐸 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
6
                  (7) 
where E index is a count from 0-6 of six antitakeover provisions found most associated with 
performance (Bebchuk et al, 2009) including staggered boards, limitations on amendments to 
company bylaws, supermajority voting for business combinations and charter amendments, golden 
parachutes, and poison pills. External governance ranges from values of 0 for the most weakly-
governed companies to 1 for those most strongly governed. The second governance index is 
obtained by sorting sample companies into quartiles based on three different internal governance 
mechanisms. Higher institutional holdings (Cremers and Nair, 2005), smaller boards of directors 
(Yermack, 1996), and higher independent directors proportions (Weisbach, 1988) have each been 
associated with stronger corporate governance. Sample companies are assigned an internal 
governance index (IGI), based on the sum of the governance quartiles into which they land in any 
given year, where the strongest governance quartile is assigned a value of 4 and the weakest is 
assigned a value of 1. We transform IGI into a measure consistent with external governance using 
the following equation: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  
𝐼𝐺𝐼
12
             (8) 
Internal Governance ranges in value from 0.25 for the most weakly-governed companies to 1 for 
those most strongly governed. Both governance measures are constructed so that higher values 
indicate stronger governance.  
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that firm-level 
antitakeover indexes are associated with strong performance, although Bebchuk et al. (2013) 
report evidence indicating the association between governance and performance has disappeared 
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since the early 2000s when the Gompers et al. results became widely known. To account for this 
previously documented association, we add a governance screen to our benchmark companies’ 
selection when computing our performance variables. We define well-governed, neutrally-
governed, and poorly-governed companies as those with E indexes of 0 or 1, 2 or 3, and 4 or 
greater, respectively. We term these three groupings of companies the “governance groups.” In 
selecting the benchmark company, using the Lie (2005) adjusted operating performance 
methodology or the DGTW abnormal stock returns methodology, we require the matched 
company to be in the same governance group, thus controlling for the well-known “governance 
effect.”17 
Table 9 presents the second-stage Heckman regression results when the dependent 
variables are the performance and governance-adjusted operating performance of repurchasing 
companies, and when we replace the state law index with the two firm-level governance 
measures defined above. The estimated coefficients on external governance are positive and 
significant for the full sample and pre-2001 subsample periods, indicating a positive association 
between strong governance and post-announcement operating performance. In the post-2000 
subperiod, the relation between external governance and operating performance disappears. 
These findings are fully consistent with our Table 3 results using the state law index, and 
supports Hypotheses 1 and 3. Finally, the estimated coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with those in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
Table 10 contains the second-stage Heckman regression results when the dependent 
variables are the governance-adjusted abnormal stock returns of repurchasing companies and the 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately, there are not enough observations to match a benchmark company on E index itself, which is why 
we develop and use governance groups as our screen. 
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independent variables include our firm-level governance measures. While the estimated 
coefficients on external governance are positive for the full and pre-2001 sample periods, only 
the estimate in Model 1 is statistically significant. All the post-2000 estimates are insignificant 
and two are negative. While the estimates signs are consistent with those in Table 4, their general 
lack of statistical significance indicates that support for Hypothesis 2 is weak using these 
measures of governance. Interestingly, the estimates for the control variable Internal governance 
are positive and significant for the full sample period and the post-2000 subsample period. 
Results for the other control variables are generally consistent with those in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
4.6 Tests of factors affecting post-announcement performance  
In this section we test Hypotheses 4 and 5. As noted above, investing in managerial 
incentives is one way strongly-governed firms can use financial flexibility to enhance 
performance. Table 11 presents stage two Heckman regression results when the dependent 
variable is sample firms’ post-announcement changes in CEO options.18 For the full sample 
period, Models 1-3, strongly-governed companies tend to invest relatively more in CEO equity 
incentives than do weakly-governed firms. This finding supports Hypothesis 4, and is consistent 
with our regression results in Tables 3 and 4. The results after splitting our sample into 
subperiods are consistent with Hypothesis 3; the association between strong governance and 
investments in CEO equity incentives disappears after the start of 2001. 
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
18 We construct this variable by first computing the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of CEO options granted to 
company market value for years 0, +1, +2, and +3, where year 0 is the announcement year. To compute the change 
in CEO options granted we subtract the average annual post-announcement ratio from the respective pre-
announcement ratio. For example, to compute a company’s 3-year post-announcement change in CEO options 
granted ratio, we find the average option ratio over years +1, +2, and +3 and subtract from it the year 0 ratio. 
30 
 
The dependent variables in the stage-two Heckman regressions presented in Table 12 are 
change indicator variables of sample firms’ acquisition activity surrounding repurchase 
announcements.19 We develop Hypothesis 5 mindful that strong governance does not necessarily 
imply an investment environment with positive net present value investment opportunities. 
Hence, we modify our governance variable to facilitate the joint test implied by Hypothesis 5. 
We define a dummy variable, StrongGov, to equal 1 when a firm’s state antitakeover law index 
is below the panel sample’s median index value, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define the 
dummy variable PosNPV to equal 1 when the firm’s market-to-book ratio (which we use to 
proxy for Tobin’s Q) is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. The stage-one Heckman probit 
regressions are identical to those estimated previously, although estimated coefficients change 
when subsamples are used. In the second stage regressions, we replace the independent variables 
Antitakeover law index and BM with dummy variables StrongGov and PosNPV, respectively. 
We also include the interaction term StrongGov X PosNPV. The interaction term captures the 
effect of strong governance coupled with superior growth opportunities on post-announcement 
changes in acquisition activities. A statistically significant positive estimated coefficient provides 
support for Hypothesis 5. In addition, StrongGov captures the effect on acquisition activity 
changes when the firm has strong governance but inferior investment opportunities, while 
PosNPV captures the effect on acquisition activity changes when the firm has weak governance 
and superior investment opportunities. Models 1-3 present the full sample period results. The 
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms in all three models are positive and statistically 
                                                 
19 We construct the acquisition change indicator dependent variable as the difference between change indicators in 
the pre- and post-announcement periods.  PreAcq is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm acquires one or 
more companies through merger or acquisition between quarters -3 and 0, and 0 otherwise.  PostAcq is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm acquires one or more companies between quarters +1 and +4, +1 and +8, and +1 
and +12, for years 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  The acquisition change dependent variable equals PostAcq minus 
PreAcq and can only take the values -1, 0, and +1. 
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significant, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5; strongly-governed firms with superior 
investment opportunities increase their acquisition activities relatively more than other sample 
firms. The estimates on dummy variables StrongGov and PosNPV are all negative and 
statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, but not significant in Model 3. In general, these results 
indicate strongly-governed (weakly-governed) firms with inferior (superior) investment 
opportunities tend to reduce post-announcement acquisitions relative to strongly-governed firms 
with superior opportunities. The subperiod results are consistent with Hypothesis 3; statistically 
significant results pre-2001 become insignificant post-2000.  
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
In this section, we examine two ways in which companies can affect post-announcement 
performance via the financial flexibility afforded by share repurchases. Companies can invest 
more in executive incentive compensation, and they can invest more in acquiring companies 
through the mergers and acquisitions market. Strongly-governed companies out-invest all other 
sample companies in both ways. In Tables 3 and 4 we show that better post-announcement 
performance is related to stronger CEO incentive compensation. Here we show that strong 
governance and larger post-announcement increases in CEO incentive pay are related. These 
results are consistent with increased executive effort producing the better performance we 
document. Similarly, our evidence that strongly-governed companies with superior investment 
opportunities increase acquisition activity more than other sample firms, which like increased 
CEO incentive compensation is also consistent with better performance.  
5. Summary and conclusion 
This paper finds that strongly-governed companies tend to perform better after making 
share repurchase program announcements relative to weakly-governed companies. Using an 
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agency-cost argument, John et al. (2015) show that companies with weak governance systems 
tend to pre-commit to cash dividends, while companies with strong governance tend to 
repurchase shares, concluding that sample companies substitute strength of governance with cash 
payout policies in an effort to find the optimal mix of agency-cost reduction and financial 
flexibility.  Pre-committing to cash dividends constrains future decisions by weakly-governed 
companies, which reduces agency conflicts in these firms. In contrast, buying back shares allows 
strongly-governed companies to put their greater financial flexibility to work when attractive 
future investment opportunities appear. Borrowing their argument, we hypothesize that financial 
flexibility gained from not pre-committing to paying cash dividends allows strongly-governed 
companies to outperform financially constrained, weakly-governed companies.   
Using a largely exogenous measure of corporate governance, our empirical results 
indicate that strongly-governed companies tend to have higher adjusted operating performance 
and abnormal stock returns than do weakly-governed companies in the 1, 2, and 3 years after 
making a share repurchase plan announcement. This finding is robust to limiting the sample to 
only companies that carry through with actual share buybacks, have not made a share repurchase 
announcement within the last year, and to a different measure of governance. We also show that 
in the post-announcement period, strongly-governed companies tend to invest relatively more in 
CEO incentive compensation, and to increase their acquisition activity relatively more than 
weakly governed companies, which could explain strongly-governed companies’ better long-
term performance. In short, we find that strongly-governed companies announcing share 
repurchases create more value for their shareholders in the post-announcement period than do 
weakly-governed companies.   
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Finally, our major findings are all dependent on the time period of the tests. The 
associations we find between governance and performance, CEO incentive compensation, and 
acquisition activity are statistically significant over the full sample period we study, and in the 
first subperiod ending in December 2000, but disappear in our latter subperiod starting in 
January 2001. This last finding is consistent with the growing literature on attenuation of former 
anomalies as the market is subject to increased arbitrage activities and enhanced regulations 
(Chordia et al., 2013, Fu and Huang, 2015 and Bebchuk et al., 2014). 
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Appendix A. 
Calculation of Abnormal Accruals 
 
Following Gong et al. (2008), we use a version of the Jones (1991) model as modified by Louis, 
Robinson, and Sbaraglia (2008) and Louis and White (2007) to calculate abnormal accruals. For 
each calendar quarter and 2-digit SIC industry, we estimate the following model using all 
companies that have the necessary data on Compustat: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=0
𝑄𝑗,𝑖 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖 +   𝛽7𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
where TA is total accruals of company i; Qj is a variable that takes the value of 1 for fiscal 
quarter j and 0 otherwise; ∆SALE is the quarterly change in sales; PPE is property, plant, and 
equipment at the beginning of the quarter; LTA is the lag of total accruals; ASSET is total assets 
at the beginning of the quarter; and ε is the regression residual and our estimate of abnormal 
accruals. All the variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter. Each calendar 
quarter, we delete the top and bottom 1 percentiles of the deflated TA, ΔSALE, PPE, and LTA. 
We also require at least 20 observations per estimation. Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
(2005), we adjust the estimated abnormal accruals for performance. For each quarter, we sort 
each 2-digit SIC industry into five quintiles, with at least four companies each, based on the 
return-on-assets (ROA) from the same quarter in the previous year. Sample companies are then 
matched based on their own ROA with a performance-based, industry quintile. The performance-
matched abnormal accruals for a sample company, AbAcc, are the firm-specific abnormal 
accruals minus the median abnormal accruals for its respective industry-performance-matched 
portfolio.  
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 Appendix B - variable definitions  
 Description  
Variable Governance measures Source 
Antitakeover law 
index  
(Index) 
The total number of antitakeover law (business combination, fair price, 
control share acquisition, poison pill, and director's duties) in effect in 
the state of the firm's incorporation. Firms that motivate and lobby for 
these laws are excluded. 
Karpoff and Wittry 
(2015) 
External 
governance 
(ExGov) 
(6 - E) / 6, where E is the Entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009, 
which counts the total number of the following provisions: classified 
board, limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charter, supermajority 
requirement to approve merger, poison pill, and golden parachute. 
ISS/Riskmetrics 
Internal 
governance 
(InGov) 
The average annual firm ranks according to the largest institutional 
holding, proportion of independent directors on board, and number of 
directors on the board. The ranks are then scaled to [0,1]. 
Thomson Financial 
13F, ISS/Riskmetrics 
   
Firm characteristics 
Free cash flow 
(FCF) 
(oibdpq + xintq + txtq + capxy)/atq, where capxy is transformed from a 
year-to-date to a quarterly measure. 
Compustat Quarterly 
Book-to-market 
(BM) 
atq/(cshoq * prccq) Compustat Quarterly 
Log (total assets) 
(LTA) 
the logarithm of atq Compustat Quarterly 
Book leverage 
(Lev) 
(dlcq + dlttq)/(dlcq + dlttq + ceqq) Compustat Quarterly 
CEO options  
(Opt) 
The ratio of aggregate S&P Black-Scholes value of stock options 
granted during the year to firm market value.  
[(option_awards_blk_value/1000)/(cshoq X prccq_f + dlc + dltt)]x100 
Execucomp 
CEO ownership 
(Own) 
The ratio of the number of shares held by the CEO, excluding stock 
options (shrown_excl_opts) to the number of common shares 
outstanding, times a hundred. 
Execucomp 
Payout/operating 
cash flow  
(P/OCF) 
(dvy + prstkcy)/oibdpq, where both dvy and prstkcy are transformed 
from a year-to-date to a quarterly measure. 
Compustat Quarterly 
Takeover threat 
(Threat) 
The number of firms involved in a merger and acquisition within a 
industry-quarter. Industry code follows Fama-French 12 classification. 
Compustat Quarterly 
Tax  
(Tax)  
txtq/(oibdpq - dpq) Compustat Quarterly 
Risk 
(Risk) 
The standard deviation of excess daily return, measured as the difference 
between daily stock return (ret) and daily value-weighted index return 
(vwretd) during a fiscal quarter. 
CRSP 
Sale Growth  
(Grow) 
The quarter-to-quarter sales growth. Compustat Quarterly 
Abnormal Accrual 
(Acc) 
The average of the performance-matched abnormal total accruals (Gong, 
Louis and Sun, 2008) for quarter -1 and quarter 0. 
Compustat Quarterly 
Abbreviations, in parentheses, appear on Table 1, Panel B. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: Variables. Descriptive company statistics for our panel data. Financial variables and 
SIC codes are obtained from Compustat. 
Variables Obs Mean Median Standard deviation 
Antitakeover law index 53,523 2.22 1.00 1.64 
Internal governance 42,170 0.63 0.67 0.15 
External governance 53,523 0.58 0.50 0.24 
Free cash flow 53,242 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Book-to-market 53,493 1.59 1.14 1.92 
Log (total assets) 53,523 7.55 7.44 1.47 
Book leverage 53,431 0.39 0.39 0.25 
CEO options 53,523 0.03 0.00 0.08 
CEO ownership 53,523 1.46 0.15 4.32 
Payout/operating cash flow 53,523 0.22 0.10 0.40 
Takeover threat 53,523 5.39 2.00 7.77 
Tax 53,503 0.24 0.29 0.49 
Risk 53,519 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Sale growth (%) 53,519 0.04 0.02 0.19 
Abnormal accruals   1,731 0.00 0.00 0.02 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Panel B: Correlations among the regression variables (see Appendix B for definitions and abbreviations).  P-values are in the brackets. 
 Index InGov ExGov FCF BM L(TA) Lev Opt Own P/OCF Threat Tax Risk Grow Acc 
Index 1               
InGov -0.052 1              
 (0.000)               
ExGov -0.144 -0.115 1             
 (0.000) (0.000)              
FCF 0.023 -0.013 0.037 1            
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)             
BM 0.004 0.006 -0.026 -0.215 1           
 (0.345) (0.249) (0.000) (0.000)            
L(TA) -0.016 0.239 -0.007 -0.009 0.072 1          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.031) (0.000)           
Lev 0.019 0.093 -0.048 -0.081 0.382 0.235 1         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
Opt -0.061 -0.065 0.036 -0.032 -0.045 -0.176 -0.087 1        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Own 0.052 -0.153 0.103 0.052 -0.055 -0.144 -0.143 0.043 1       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
P/OCF 0.014 0.015 -0.01 0.068 -0.132 0.052 -0.103 -0.01 0.006 1      
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.175)       
Threat -0.083 0.012 -0.011 -0.006 -0.123 -0.003 -0.216 0.09 0.022 0.079 1     
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.008) (0.187) (0.000) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000      
Tax -0.001 -0.027 0.015 0.138 -0.085 -0.002 -0.113 -0.003 0.032 0.038 -0.027 1    
 (0.893) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.619) (0.000) (0.497) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000     
Risk -0.106 0.007 0.036 -0.187 0.334 -0.313 0.045 0.196 0.053 -0.116 0.069 -0.067 1   
 (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Grow -0.003 -0.026 0.015 0.229 -0.025 -0.001 0.006 0.001 0.011 -0.08 0.004 0.015 -0.024 1  
 (0.421) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.881) (0.156) (0.896) (0.010) (0.000) (0.317) (0.000) (0.000)   
Acc 0.013 -0.035 -0.049 0.046 0.043 0.01 0.042 -0.016 0.033 -0.085 0.042 -0.04 -0.082 0.133 1 
 (0.599) (0.160) (0.041) (0.055) (0.071) (0.670) (0.078) (0.509) (0.168) (0.000) (0.079) (0.100) (0.001) (0.000)  
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Table 2. 
Corporate payout. This table examines the relation between corporate governance (antitakeover law index) 
and the corporate payout. Probit is used in columns (1)-(5), where the dependent variable equals zero if a 
payout announcement is made and zero otherwise. Tobit with censoring at 0 is used in columns (6) and (7), 
where the dependent variable is the ratio of the dollar payout to operating cash flow. Standard errors are 
clustered by state in columns (2)-(7). Rep (Div) refers to repurchase (dividend) announcement. All 
independent variables are measured in t-1. Robust z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Specification Probit Tobit 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
variable: 
All Rep 
[0/1] 
All Rep 
[0/1] 
Rep-Only 
[0/1] 
Div-Only 
[0/1] 
Div Inc 
[0/1] Rep/OCF Div/OCF 
Antitakeover law 
index  -0.019***    -0.019* -0.048***     0.050*     0.031**   -0.016** 0.029*** 
   [-2.800]   [-1.901]    [-2.669]    [1.671]    [2.458]  [-2.165]    [3.226] 
Free cash flow 3.699*** 3.699*** 2.740***     0.272 2.833*** 3.127***     0.592 
    [9.924]  [12.565]      [8.346]    [0.281]    [2.968]  [10.930]    [1.298] 
Book-to-market -0.097*** -0.097***      -0.041    -0.024* -0.188*** -0.060***    -0.009** 
   [-6.557]   [-4.699]    [-1.555]   [-1.666]   [-8.390]  [-4.500]   [-2.410] 
Log (total assets) 0.080*** 0.080***       0.014 0.160*** 0.096*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
  [10.150]    [4.862]      [0.440]    [6.167]    [8.922]  [10.028] [5.875] 
Book leverage -0.170*** -0.170***      -0.145** -0.353*** -0.276*** -0.306***    -0.143** 
   [-3.386]   [-2.927]     [-2.320]   [-2.649]   [-4.707] [-11.568]   [-2.237] 
CEO options 0.665*** 0.665***  0.722*** -1.011*** -0.832*** 0.277*** -0.603*** 
    [5.777]    [4.393]      [4.374]   [-8.607]   [-5.265]    [7.856]   [-8.341] 
CEO ownership      0.001     0.001       0.004*     0.006      0.001     0.001     0.001 
     [0.409]    [0.404]      [1.663]    [1.274]    [0.230]    [0.845]    [0.248] 
Payout/OCF 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.124***   0.550*** 0.130*** 0.490*** 0.300*** 
  [12.456]  [15.388]      [4.472] [4.720]    [5.936]  [39.244]    [8.095] 
Takeover threat 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010***  -0.030*** -0.016*** 0.004*** -0.011*** 
    [3.077]    [3.350]      [3.835]   [-5.633] [-14.675]    [9.006]   [-6.309] 
Tax      0.018      0.018       0.005     0.040**      0.054**     0.019**      0.007 
    [0.732]    [0.597]      [0.152]    [2.073]    [2.541]    [2.356] [0.643] 
Risk    -0.698    -0.698 6.568*** -19.070*** -25.202***    -2.426 -10.604*** 
   [-0.618]  [-0.478]      [5.239]   [-4.484] [-12.342]   [-1.467]   [-8.844] 
Sales growth (%)    -0.141** -0.141***      -0.062    -0.185*      0.053 -0.142*** -0.176*** 
   [-2.326]   [-2.699]     [-0.791]   [-1.928]    [0.534]   [-3.221]   [-5.091] 
Constant  -2.470***   -2.470*** -2.527***   -0.470*** -1.423*** -0.544***    -0.065 
 [-31.703] [-14.713]  [-11.670]   [-3.720] [-15.264] [-10.006]   [-1.467] 
Observations 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 
Pseudo R2      0.0434      0.0434       0.0347     0.115     0.0847      0.151      0.119 
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Table 3.  
Operating performance. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted operating performance, 
which is computed using the Lie (2005) benchmark method. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present 
the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Adjusted Operating Performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index -0.003* -0.008***    -0.012** -0.005** -0.013*** -0.020*** 0.002   -0.002   -0.002 
 [-1.679]  [-2.757]   [-2.382]   [-2.234] [-3.107]   [-2.954] [0.715]  [-0.517]  [-0.292] 
Free cash flow 0.028 0.904*** 1.539***    -0.037 0.905*** 1.616*** -0.033 0.687*** 1.242*** 
 [0.251]   [4.263]     [4.435]   [-0.255] [3.365]    [3.850] [-0.245]   [2.621]    [2.700] 
Book-to-market -0.008* -0.029*** -0.042***    -0.006 -0.017    -0.024 -0.003 -0.030***    -0.046** 
 [-1.735]  [-3.490]   [-3.105]   [-0.987] [-1.566]   [-1.479] [-0.494]  [-2.707]   [-2.332] 
Log (total assets)    0.004*     0.003    -0.001      0.004 -0.001    -0.009 0.001    0.003     0.001 
 [1.815]   [0.591]   [-0.158]    [1.253] [-0.199]   [-0.882] [0.520]   [0.556]    [0.152] 
Book leverage -0.024   -0.055**    -0.090**    -0.020 -0.106**    -0.174** -0.019   -0.009    -0.018 
 [-1.639]  [-2.003]   [-2.004]   [-0.821] [-2.387]   [-2.504] [-1.158]  [-0.286]  [-0.317] 
CEO options 0.046 0.198*** 0.311***      0.012 0.068     0.047 0.066 0.284*** 0.547*** 
 [1.352]   [3.134]    [3.012]    [0.240] [0.756]    [0.334] [1.569]   [3.464]   [3.807] 
CEO ownership -0.001     0.000     0.002    -0.000 -0.000    0.000 -0.001   -0.000     0.001 
 [-1.245]   [0.084]    [0.878]   [-0.405] [-0.312]   [0.165] [-1.114]  [-0.129]   [0.319] 
Abnormal accrual 0.094   -0.092    -0.453      0.054 0.087   -0.080 0.149   -0.347   -0.993* 
 [0.846]  [-0.437]   [-1.307]     [0.357] [0.311]  [-0.184] [0.892]  [-1.062]  [-1.729] 
Lambda      0.0472**     0.0492      0.00152      0.0324 -0.0213   -0.0898   0.0188     0.0276   -0.0244 
 [2.076]   [1.155]     [0.0218]     [1.213] [-0.436]  [-1.174] [1.030]    [0.772]  [-0.390] 
Constant  -0.119*   -0.079      0.083     -0.078 0.133     0.381* -0.045    -0.058     0.078 
 [-1.893]  [-0.669]     [0.430]    [-1.078] [0.999]    [1.837] [-0.811]   [-0.534]    [0.410] 
Observations (censored) 1716 1716 1716  860 860 860 856 856 856 
Wald χ2     12.22        58.73    69.36     9.531    44.93   53.20 6.765    33.55 39.99 
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Table 4.  
Stock performance. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal long-term performance 
regressions, which is computed using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure. Columns (1)-(3) 
show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. 
All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at less than the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Stock Performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
                    
Antitakeover law index  -0.010*   -0.016**   -0.014*   -0.023** -0.036***   -0.033** -0.003   -0.006   -0.007 
 [-1.769]  [-2.199]  [-1.680]  [-2.268]  [-3.020]  [-2.350] [-0.519]  [-0.697]  [-0.702] 
Free cash flow  -0.181    0.072    0.324   -0.998   -1.232*   -1.214  0.177    0.583     0.879 
 [-0.451]   [0.145]   [0.551]  [-1.623]  [-1.660]  [-1.403]  [0.479]   [1.116]   [1.409] 
Book-to-market   0.026*    0.000   -0.028 0.093*** 0.093***    0.066** -0.022 -0.066*** -0.079*** 
  [1.652]   [0.023]  [-1.204]   [3.907]   [3.241]   [1.983] [-1.393]  [-2.928]  [-2.988] 
Log (total assets)  -0.018**   -0.020*   -0.022* -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.080***  0.003     0.009     0.012 
 [-2.018]  [-1.834]  [-1.729]  [-3.680]  [-3.790]  [-3.938]  [0.399]    [0.812]   [0.921] 
Book leverage   0.006    0.034    0.063    0.010     0.163    0.202  0.039    -0.033    0.004 
  [0.102]   [0.527]   [0.829]   [0.095]    [1.349]   [1.429]  [0.829]  [-0.513]   [0.059] 
CEO options   0.280** 0.431*** 0.512***    0.368* 0.753*** 0.851***  0.018   -0.260   -0.314 
  [2.348]   [2.928]   [2.931]   [1.797]   [3.049]   [2.956]  [0.159]  [-1.604]  [-1.625] 
CEO ownership   0.002   -0.001   -0.003   -0.001   -0.005   -0.008 -0.003   -0.011**   -0.013** 
  [0.971]  [-0.406]  [-0.865]  [-0.237]  [-1.260]  [-1.631] [-1.105]  [-2.505]  [-2.563] 
Abnormal accrual  -0.264   -0.798   -0.820   -0.085   -0.360   -0.388 -0.350   -1.170*   -1.041 
 [-0.660]  [-1.622]  [-1.412]  [-0.139]  [-0.499]  [-0.455] [-0.769]  [-1.932]  [-1.454] 
Lambda  -0.003    0.124     0.220* -0.408*** -0.579*** -0.604***      0.102** 0.347*** 0.437*** 
 [-0.0337]   [1.235]   [1.852]  [-3.593]  [-4.198]  [-3.777]  [2.014]   [4.798]   [5.064] 
Constant    0.188   -0.014   -0.161 1.310*** 1.801*** 2.016***  -0.199 -0.683*** -0.879*** 
   [0.839]  [-0.051]  [-0.492]   [4.242]   [4.809]   [4.637]  [-1.296]  [-3.116]  [-3.366] 
Observations (censored) 1720 1724 1726 861 862 862 859 862 864 
Wald χ2  24.86  29.78   30.40   42.27  51.83   43.18   5.025   25.11 24.91 
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Table 5. 
Operating performance for carry-through repurchase sample. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-
announcement adjusted operating performance for the subsample that actually repurchased shares, which is computed using the Lie (2005) 
benchmark method. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods 
pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Adjusted operating performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index -0.004**  -0.009***   -0.013** -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.023*** 0.001  -0.003   -0.003 
  [-2.163]  [-2.767]  [-2.293] [-3.009] [-3.211] [-2.905] [0.667] [-0.621]  [-0.434] 
Free cash flow   -0.049 0.826*** 1.483***  -0.120 0.860*** 1.562*** -0.016  0.801*** 1.461*** 
  [-0.435]   [3.825]   [4.158] [-0.790]  [2.957]  [3.425] [-0.115]  [2.811]    [2.902] 
Book-to-market   -0.007 -0.028***   -0.038**  -0.003  -0.015  -0.019 -0.003  -0.031**    -0.047** 
  [-1.290]  [-2.631]   [-2.190] [-0.434] [-1.023] [-0.797] [-0.445] [-2.536]   [-2.175] 
Log (total assets)     0.002   -0.002     -0.009    0.000  -0.005   -0.014 0.002   0.003      0.000 
    [0.921] [-0.389]   [-1.151]   [0.100] [-0.838] [-1.394] [0.521]  [0.575]     [0.017] 
Book leverage    -0.014   -0.037    -0.061   -0.012  -0.104**  -0.176** -0.009   0.008      0.015 
  [-0.928] [-1.289]  [-1.269]  [-0.441] [-2.094] [-2.251] [-0.541]  [0.242]    [0.258] 
CEO options     0.021   0.230*** 0.315***   -0.024    0.052    0.030 0.071  0.424***  0.648*** 
    [0.578]  [3.237]    [2.682]  [-0.437]  [0.506]  [0.189] [1.486]  [4.453]    [3.847] 
CEO ownership    -0.001   0.000     0.002   -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 -0.001  -0.000      0.001 
  [-1.096]  [0.235]    [0.818] [-0.736] [-0.347] [-0.083] [-0.650] [-0.155]     [0.279] 
Abnormal accrual     0.071  -0.147    -0.603    0.026    0.043  -0.174 0.119  -0.439    -1.242** 
    [0.606] [-0.644]  [-1.605]   [0.162]  [0.139] [-0.362] [0.674] [-1.253]   [-1.999] 
Lambda     0.0261    0.00622   -0.0659    0.00380  -0.0593  -0.157 0.0150    0.0307     -0.0243 
    [1.277]   [0.157]  [-1.008]   [0.156] [-1.268] [-2.133] [0.837]   [0.859]   [-0.385] 
Constant    -0.055    0.044     0.275     0.015   0.250** 0.571*** -0.042   -0.079      0.068 
   [-0.997]   [0.415]   [1.555]   [0.236]  [2.071]  [3.009] [-0.757]  [-0.719]     [0.348] 
Observations (censored) 1504 1504 1504 723 723 723 781 781 781 
Wald χ2      9.181  52.20  59.66   11.63  33.89  38.21    4.138   44.18    44.14 
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Table 6.  
Stock performance for carry-through repurchase sample. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement 
abnormal long-term stock returns for the subsample that actually repurchased shares, which is computed using the Daniel et al. (1997) 
benchmark adjustment procedure. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the 
subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Abnormal stock performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index      -0.006      -0.013     -0.013      -0.018     -0.032**    -0.031* 0.001  -0.003     -0.006 
    [-0.866]    [-1.573]    [-1.436]    [-1.502]    [-2.307]   [-1.924] [0.242] [-0.349]    [-0.619] 
Free cash flow      -0.246      -0.342     -0.129      -0.740     -0.753    -0.594 0.259   0.286      0.483 
    [-0.593]     [-0.679]    [-0.218]    [-1.111]    [-0.951]   [-0.651] [0.648]  [0.512]     [0.723] 
Book-to-market  0.046**       0.017     -0.007 0.144***  0.151*** 0.132*** -0.014 -0.070***   -0.085*** 
      [2.247]      [0.663]    [-0.245]      [4.210]      [3.729]    [2.828] [-0.816] [-2.872]    [-2.991] 
Log (total assets)  -0.021**  -0.028***     -0.032**  -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.064*** 0.001    0.007      0.010 
     [-2.391]    [-2.601]    [-2.560]    [-2.725]    [-2.873]   [-3.115] [0.062]  [0.625]    [0.702] 
Book leverage       0.013       0.087      0.115      -0.000       0.192      0.226 0.027   -0.016      0.022 
      [0.231]      [1.266]    [1.452]     [-0.000]     [1.425]    [1.452] [0.553] [-0.241]    [0.293] 
CEO options       0.264* 0.432***  0.560***       0.448* 0.874*** 1.053*** -0.105  -0.434**    -0.476** 
      [1.950]      [2.621]    [2.900]      [1.908]     [3.143]    [3.278] [-0.803] [-2.381]   [-2.180] 
CEO ownership       0.001      -0.002    -0.003      -0.001     -0.005    -0.008 -0.004 -0.011***   -0.014*** 
      [0.531]    [-0.578]   [-1.031]    [-0.400]    [-1.195]   [-1.524] [-1.138] [-2.606]   [-2.698] 
Abnormal accrual      -0.291      -0.840    -0.870      -0.068      -0.418    -0.359 -0.512  -1.359**    -1.408* 
     [-0.667]    [-1.579]   [-1.395]    [-0.101]    [-0.532]   [-0.390] [-1.046] [-2.080]   [-1.822] 
Lambda      -0.0737     -0.0142      0.0723  -0.433***  -0.609*** -0.615***     0.0691  0.299*** 0.391*** 
     [-0.965]    [-0.153]     [0.666]    [-3.992]    [-4.701]   [-4.136]  [1.376]  [4.207]    [4.597] 
Constant        0.341*       0.319      0.208  1.217***  1.676*** 1.836*** -0.124 -0.569*** -0.755*** 
       [1.648]     [1.268]     [0.707]      [4.354]     [5.021]    [4.789] [-0.801] [-2.599]   [-2.883] 
Observations (censored) 1507 1510 1512 723 723 723 784 787 789 
Wald χ2      21.08      27.29    29.69     39.15    49.47   43.05  5.315  26.85    26.59 
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Table 7. 
Operating performance for fresh repurchase sample. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted 
operating performance for the firms that initiate a fresh repurchase (no share repurchase in the prior 4 quarters), which is computed using the Lie 
(2005) benchmark method. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods 
pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Adjusted operating performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index -0.002 -0.011**  -0.017** -0.006* -0.015** -0.021* 0.003 -0.000     0.002 
 [-0.925]  [-2.124] [-1.979]   [-1.836] [-2.210]  [-1.848] [0.897] [-0.038]    [0.194] 
Free cash flow -0.079 1.436**  2.913***     0.047    0.621     1.095 -0.148 0.594 1.415** 
 [-0.260]   [2.297]  [2.805]     [0.191]   [1.268]    [1.315] [-0.778] [1.589]    [2.106] 
Book-to-market -0.003   -0.046*  -0.077*    -0.010     0.009     0.034   0.002 -0.039**    -0.058* 
 [-0.227]  [-1.743] [-1.768]   [-0.918]   [0.438]    [0.940]  [0.166] [-2.108]   [-1.773] 
Log (total assets)  0.004     0.018    0.035     0.012   -0.009    -0.029  -0.000  0.004     0.009 
  [0.455]    [1.112]  [1.265]    [1.465]  [-0.583]   [-1.054] [-0.008] [0.475]    [0.556] 
Book leverage -0.018    -0.109  -0.236*   -0.033   -0.048    -0.075  -0.027 0.022     0.016 
 [-0.474]   [-1.373] [-1.788]   [-0.688]  [-0.505]   [-0.465] [-1.079] [0.435]    [0.177] 
CEO options  0.037 0.294*    0.555*     0.083   -0.021    -0.149  0.030 0.168 0.372** 
  [0.441]    [1.668]   [1.897]     [1.016]  [-0.126]   [-0.533]  [0.567] [1.591]    [1.963] 
CEO ownership -0.000     0.002    0.004      0.001   -0.002    -0.003  -0.001 0.002      0.004 
 [-0.340]    [0.991]   [1.543]      [0.740]  [-0.688]   [-0.656]  [-0.589] [0.556]    [0.850] 
Abnormal accrual   0.173     0.156   -0.054       0.130     0.285     0.201  0.271 -0.015    -0.457 
   [1.188]    [0.554]  [-0.117]      [0.658]   [0.761]   [0.347]  [1.235] [-0.035]   [-0.591] 
Lambda     0.0206     0.252     0.449      0.118   -0.318 -0.712*   -0.0121 0.00781    -0.0675 
   [0.157]    [0.928]   [0.997]      [1.029]  [-1.383]  [-1.812] [-0.255]    [0.0842]   [-0.405] 
Constant  -0.061    -0.668    -1.219     -0.334     0.868 1.952*  0.037 -0.026      0.113 
 [-0.169]   [-0.902]  [-0.990]    [-1.083]   [1.409]   [1.850]  [0.271] [-0.097]    [0.236] 
Observations (censored) 1089 1089 1089 573 573 573 516 516 516 
Wald χ2  5.606    13.97   20.07     6.770   11.43   12.44  6.228    13.00    16.15 
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Table 8.  
Stock performance for fresh repurchase sample. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal 
long-term stock returns for the subsample that initiates a fresh repurchase (no share repurchase in the prior 4 quarters), which are computed using 
the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present 
the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Abnormal stock performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index   -0.030* -0.039*  -0.046   -0.027*    -0.037*   -0.035 -0.006  -0.014   -0.012 
    [-1.834] [-1.744]  [-1.376]     [-1.834]   [-1.802]  [-1.555] [-0.738] [-1.076]  [-0.783] 
Free cash flow    3.478* 4.259  6.370 -1.003    -2.106   -2.147  0.344   1.139     1.343 
  [1.808] [1.636]  [1.633] [-0.919]   [-1.415]  [-1.290] [0.647]  [1.360]    [1.358] 
Book-to-market  -0.089 -0.154  -0.260 0.145*** 0.165*** 0.147** -0.023  -0.095**    -0.121** 
  [-1.130] [-1.420]  [-1.603] [3.100] [2.603]   [2.060] [-0.884] [-2.351]  [ -2.530] 
Log (total assets)   0.079 0.091   0.141    -0.074**    -0.114** -0.127**   0.001    0.014      0.021 
   [1.467] [1.263]  [1.330] [-2.032]    [-2.321]  [-2.327]  [0.085]   [0.636]     [0.871] 
Book leverage   -0.472* -0.533 -0.670  0.117   0.392     0.448  0.079   -0.105     -0.001 
  [-1.704] [-1.519] [-1.332]  [0.535]   [1.369]    [1.400]  [1.001]  [-0.897]    [-0.008] 
CEO options      1.154** 1.439*     1.974*  0.119    0.250     0.237  0.090   -0.059     -0.113 
   [2.071] [1.926]   [1.780]  [0.321]   [0.495]    [0.421]  [0.599]  [-0.241]   [-0.392] 
CEO ownership   0.006 0.004   0.003  0.001  -0.007    -0.010 -0.002   -0.013**     -0.012* 
   [1.220] [0.547]   [0.324]  [0.113]  [-0.799]   [-1.034] [-0.554]  [-2.098]   [-1.721] 
Abnormal accrual    0.013 -0.631  -0.897  0.032  -0.356    -0.575 -0.450   -1.361*     -1.668* 
    [0.019] [-0.670]  [-0.638]  [0.040]  [-0.384]  [-0.522] [-0.736]  [-1.686]   [-1.782] 
Lambda     1.525* 2.017*      3.013*   -0.879*      -1.543** -1.586**     0.0941 0.646*** 0.777*** 
   [1.803] [1.761]    [1.779] [-1.703]  [-2.181] [-2.014]   [0.709]    [3.062] [3.142] 
Constant    -4.058* -5.202*    -7.839*    2.529*       4.380** 4.635**   -0.194    -1.446** -1.815** 
  [-1.748] [-1.656]  [-1.689]  [1.824]   [2.307]   [2.194]   [-0.505]   [-2.357] [-2.527] 
Observations (censored) 1090 1093 1094 574 575 575 516 518 519 
Wald χ2   8.702  7.563   5.317     23.19     20.22   16.22    4.635    16.13      15.94 
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Table 9. 
Operating performance—robustness to governance measure. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement 
adjusted operating performance, which is computed using the Lie (2005) benchmark method. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. 
Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. 
Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Adjusted operating performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
External governance     0.029** 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.064*** 0.146*** 0.188*** -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 
    [2.349] [3.212] [2.743] [3.161] [4.033] [3.309] [-0.250] [-0.393] [-0.217] 
Internal governance     0.040* -0.009 -0.038 0.035 -0.026 -0.037 0.051** -0.021 -0.089 
    [1.660] [-0.190] [-0.517] [0.881] [-0.363] [-0.329] [2.055] [-0.412] [-1.021] 
Free cash flow 0.388*** 1.909*** 3.144*** 0.267 1.891*** 3.247*** 0.513*** 1.840*** 2.899*** 
    [3.085] [7.997] [8.055] [1.607] [6.340] [6.912] [3.593] [6.308] [5.797] 
Book-to-market     0.001 -0.025*** -0.047*** -0.002 -0.027** -0.049*** 0.002 -0.021 -0.038* 
    [0.115] [-2.781] [-3.236] [-0.357] [-2.395] [-2.821] [0.368] [-1.636] [-1.764] 
Log (total assets)     0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 0.007** 0.007 0.011 
    [1.440] [0.124] [0.163] [-0.146] [-0.629] [-0.887] [2.273] [1.061] [1.042] 
Book leverage -0.050*** -0.143*** -0.246*** -0.011 -0.136*** -0.236*** -0.076*** -0.144*** -0.244*** 
   [-3.090] [-4.638] [-4.888] [-0.381] [-2.731] [-3.024] [-4.159] [-3.869] [-3.830] 
CEO options  0.108*** 0.235*** 0.385*** 0.043 0.095 0.117 0.186*** 0.369*** 0.619*** 
    [2.895] [3.327] [3.336] [0.782] [0.956] [0.747] [4.143] [4.023] [3.939] 
CEO ownership    -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 
  [-1.469] [-0.526] [0.333] [-0.657] [-0.496] [0.240] [-1.763] [-0.910] [-0.514] 
Abnormal accrual     0.110 0.045 -0.267 0.251 0.383 0.285 -0.203 -0.539 -1.174* 
    [0.892] [0.191] [-0.689] [1.469] [1.233] [0.583] [-1.143] [-1.459] [-1.841] 
Lambda     0.0516* 0.0744 0.0949 0.0498 0.0304 0.0159 0.0559*** 0.0731* 0.0794 
    [1.952] [1.482] [1.157] [1.406] [0.480] [0.159] [3.065] [1.968] [1.247] 
Constant    -0.183** -0.173 -0.182 -0.169* -0.061 0.033 -0.208*** -0.172 -0.145 
   [-2.348] [-1.170] [-0.753] [-1.747] [-0.350] [0.121] [-3.396] [-1.373] [-0.677] 
Observations (censored) 1571 1571 1571 786 786 786 785 785 785 
Wald χ2   26.86  153.6  172.6    17.54   117.8    133.6     41.28     92.73    92.01 
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Table 10. 
Stock performance—robustness to governance measure. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement 
abnormal long-term stock returns, which are computed using the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure, plus a screen for governance 
group. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, 
respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at less than the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively.  
Dependent variable: Abnormal stock performance 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Performance change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
External governance     0.116*     0.093    0.046    0.132 0.169    0.135     0.077  -0.027   -0.064 
    [1.836]   [1.080]   [0.429]   [1.147] [1.061]   [0.690]    [1.175] [-0.310]  [-0.650] 
Internal governance      0.241**     0.328**     0.373*   -0.044 -0.319   -0.295 0.293*** 0.550*** 0.685*** 
    [1.990]   [1.976]   [1.818]  [-0.193] [-1.013]  [-0.759]    [2.745]  [3.858]   [4.212] 
Free cash flow    -0.132     1.080     2.481**   -0.606 1.070     3.195**     0.124    0.528    0.785 
   [-0.208]   [1.240]    [2.304]  [-0.644] [0.816]    [1.973]    [0.202]  [0.644]   [0.839] 
Book-to-market      0.043* 0.097*** 0.122*** 0.086** 0.147*** 0.203***    -0.012    0.013    0.015 
    [1.820]    [2.971]    [3.023]    [2.477] [3.064]    [3.386]   [-0.456]   [0.360]   [0.377] 
Log (total assets) -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.053***    -0.034 -0.028    -0.051    -0.016   -0.024   -0.041** 
   [-2.670]   [-2.735]   [-2.585]   [-1.590] [-0.959]   [-1.405]   [-1.229]  [-1.388]  [-2.067] 
Book leverage      0.010    -0.029    -0.144    -0.014 -0.001    -0.208      0.010   -0.117   -0.077 
    [0.115]   [-0.254]   [-1.038]   [-0.090] [-0.003]   [-0.771]    [0.122] [-1.089]  [-0.646] 
CEO options      0.475** 0.774***      0.602*  0.636** 1.296***      1.246**      0.364*    0.324     0.002 
    [2.521]    [3.001]    [1.888]    [2.028] [2.974]    [2.307]    [1.884]   [1.255]    [0.008] 
CEO ownership     0.003     0.003      0.005     0.000 -0.002     0.004    -0.005   -0.010    -0.015* 
    [0.788]    [0.568]    [0.787]    [0.072] [-0.223]    [0.442]   [-0.990]  [-1.418]   [-1.877] 
Abnormal accrual    -0.562    -0.601    -0.966    -0.057 0.687     0.199    -1.027   -2.239**    -2.705** 
   [-0.887]   [-0.692]   [-0.899]   [-0.060] [0.525]    [0.120]   [-1.304]  [-2.168]   [-2.283] 
Lambda    -0.0901    -0.0598      0.0386 -0.475** -0.728***    -0.535      0.0662     0.259**      0.246** 
   [-0.675]   [-0.326]     [0.170]   [-2.346] [-2.590]   [-1.549]     [0.846]    [2.472]     [2.060] 
Constant      0.215      0.138     -0.082  1.180**      1.712**      1.352     -0.241    -0.699**     -0.608 
    [0.546]     [0.254]   [-0.122]     [2.131] [2.227]    [1.433]    [-0.917]   [-1.984]    [-1.513] 
Observations (censored) 1565 1570 1571 782 786 786 783 784 785 
Wald χ2   36.16    44.93    39.90     17.12     22.70    26.03     17.28    28.11     35.62 
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Table 11. 
CEO incentive compensation changes. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement CEO option changes for 
sample firms, which is computed by subtracting from the respective post-announcement CEO option value to company market value ratio the 
respective ratio for year 0. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-
2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively. 
Dependent variable: CEO incentive compensation changes 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CEO option change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Antitakeover law index    -0.001**     -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.001*    -0.002** -0.002***    -0.000     -0.000     -0.001 
   [-2.213]    [-2.678] [-2.776] [-1.675] [-2.297] [-2.584]   [-0.751]    [-0.728]    [-0.754] 
Free cash flow      0.081***      0.122*** 0.120***  0.057  0.066 0.057    0.059** 0.136*** 0.155*** 
    [3.012] [3.200] [2.690]  [1.593] [1.312] [0.983]     [2.021] [3.251] [3.105] 
Book-to-market    -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001      0.001   0.003* 0.003 
   [-0.578] [0.383] [0.240] [-0.121] [0.690] [0.516] [1.143] [1.693] [1.286] 
Log (total assets)      0.000 -0.001* -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
     [0.171] [-1.727] [-2.817] [-0.859]    [-2.793] [-4.016] [-0.494] [-1.041] [-0.812] 
Book leverage     -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002     -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 
   [-1.138]    [-0.949] [-0.937]    [-0.300]    [-0.462] [-0.504] [-0.818] [-0.601] [-0.981] 
CEO options    -0.095*** -0.207*** -0.290***   -0.137*** -0.277*** -0.366*** -0.062*** -0.145*** -0.223*** 
 [-11.845]  [-18.070]  [-21.562]  [-11.453]  [-16.523]  [-18.952] [-6.924]  [-11.292]  [-14.544] 
CEO ownership    -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000      -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.001 
   [-1.180] [0.174] [-0.058] [-0.844] [-0.223]    [-0.707] [-1.888] [-1.238] [-1.366] 
Abnormal accrual    -0.074*** -0.115*** -0.161***     -0.093** -0.141*** -0.173*** -0.024 -0.035 -0.098 
   [-2.819] [-3.079] [-3.684] [-2.503] [-2.723] [-2.899] [-0.656] [-0.672] [-1.541] 
Lambda      0.0109*    0.0102   0.0127    -0.00144     -0.00910  -0.0111      0.00149 0.000944      0.00832 
     [1.948]  [1.301] [1.393] [-0.222] [-0.996]    [-1.066]  [0.364] [0.166]  [1.215] 
Constant     -0.022 -0.007 0.003   0.014      0.057** 0.085*** -0.003 0.000 -0.014 
    [-1.423] [-0.302] [0.106]   [0.799]  [2.260] [2.949] [-0.207] [0.015] [-0.676] 
Observations (censored) 1686 1643 1602 856 845 834 830 798 768 
Wald χ2  304.7    513.2   705.6    172.1   284.8   369.3   163.9   279.0    418.3 
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Table 12.  
Acquisition changes. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement change in acquisition activity for sample 
firms, which is computed by subtracting from an indicator of acquisition activity in quarters 1-4, 1-8, and 1-12 the respective indicator variable for 
quarters -3-0. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-
2001, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at less than the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed test, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Acquisition changes 
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Acquisition change after: 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
StrongGov    -0.092**   -0.071* -0.065 -0.129*** -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.025 0.067     0.093 
 [-2.377] [-1.683] [-1.494] [-3.425]    [-3.649] [-3.301] [-0.332] [0.880]     [1.250] 
StrongGov X PosNPV     0.123**      0.140** 0.150***     0.135**     0.161** 0.187***   0.091 0.083     0.073 
  [2.403]  [2.517] [2.614]  [2.563] [2.495] [2.589]  [0.992] [0.893]    [0.806] 
PosNPV     -0.090**  -0.082* -0.063     -0.092**      -0.069 -0.074 -0.070 -0.073    -0.026 
 [-1.998] [-1.678] [-1.237]     [-2.043] [-1.247] [-1.199] [-0.852] [-0.887]  [-0.321] 
Free cash flow -0.384 -0.458 -0.164  -0.817     -1.283**     -1.432**   0.652 0.851     1.418 
  [-0.711] [-0.780] [-0.271]  [-1.611] [-2.071] [-2.074]   [0.746] [0.959]    [1.611] 
Log (total assets) -0.009 0.007  0.004 -0.001  0.012   0.006 -0.008 -0.004    -0.007 
 [-0.769] [0.565]  [0.301] [-0.117]  [0.879]   [0.374] [-0.451] [-0.207]   [-0.367] 
Book leverage 0.010 -0.080 -0.029  0.015 0.035       0.222** -0.014 -0.134    -0.177* 
 [0.148]    [-1.049] [-0.371]  [0.183] [0.350]   [1.996] [-0.132] [-1.266]   [-1.683] 
CEO options -0.461*** -0.455*** -0.257  -0.498***     -0.229   0.012 -0.377     -0.672**    -0.583** 
 [-2.909] [-2.635] [-1.442] [-3.000] [-1.130]   [0.054] [-1.414] [-2.477]   [-2.164] 
CEO ownership -0.004  -0.005* -0.001 -0.009*** -0.010***      -0.005  0.004  0.004      0.006 
 [-1.609] [-1.754] [-0.261] [-3.443] [-3.017]     [-1.356]  [0.549]  [0.555]     [0.837] 
Abnormal accrual 0.308 -0.163 -0.723  0.020 -0.834      -1.203*  0.481 0.210    - 0.683 
  [0.573] [-0.279] [-1.194]  [0.039] [-1.337]    [-1.729] [0.447] [0.193]    [-0.646] 
Lambda -0.113   -0.0609    0.0383   -0.249*** -0.271***    -0.302*** 0.119     0.219**  0.366*** 
 [-1.183] [-0.588]   [0.358] [-2.903] [-2.590] [-2.586] [1.109] [2.015] [3.395] 
Constant    0.513*   0.454    0.310 0.758*** 0.827*** 0.975*** -0.046 -0.108 -0.359 
   [1.771]   [1.438]    [0.953] [3.070] [2.749] [2.907] [-0.123] [-0.287] [-0.965] 
Observations (censored) 1727 1727 1727 863 863 863 864 864 864 
Wald χ2     19.28      21.26     12.85     35.99     33.19    25.58       5.883     16.98     25.22 
 
